What are synchronized cookies?
The son of cookies is a method by which server administrators can prevent the form of attacking the service (DOS) against the server by the method known as the flood of the son. This type of attack uses a process that creates a connection between a client and a host known as a three -way handshake to make the host that the host has an excessive number of client requirements, freezing or crashing of the system. However, such attacks have largely become outdated methods such as the use of synchronized cookies that bypass them. These cookies do not pose a security threat or a risk to hosts or clients and do not cause problems or connection problems. This process is known as a three -way handshake and begins when the client system sends a request to connect to the host system. The application is called a synchronized message or son and a host system. This host system then confirms that the son was received by sending a confirmation or Syn-AC message back to the client.
As soon as the client system receives this Syn-AC message, the client sends the host the final ACK. When the host system receives this final ACK, the client allows the client to access the system and then can receive additional SYN requirements from other clients. Most host servers have a relatively small front for son's requirements, usually only eight for once.
The form of attack DOS known as son Flooding uses this to endanger the host system. This is done by sending a son to which the host is sent in response in response, but the final message ACK is not sent by the client and keeps the position open. If this is done correctly during the attack on the flood, the entire queue is occupied by these unanswered requests and is unable to accept new applications from legitimate clients.
The son of cookies helps to circumvent this type of attack by allowing the host to act as if they had a larger queue than it actually has. In pRoman attack son Flood can be used by the host the son of cookies to send a son-on client, but eliminates the item son for this client. This basically allows the host to work as if no son has never been accepted.
As soon as this syn-on with cookies is accepted by a client, the corresponding ACK sent back to the host contains data on the original syn-on. The host can then use this ACK and the SYN files included to reconstruct the original Syn-Ack and a suitable item for the original request. Once it is done, the client may be allowed to join the host, but the whole process has effectively circumvented the queue, which may otherwise be occupied by the Son flood attack.